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POSSESSION
AS SUFFICIENT PART PERFORMANCE TO RAISE
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The fourth section of the Statute of Frauds1 provides that
no action shall be brought to charge any person upon, ".
any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or
any interest in or concerning them, unless the agree-
ment upon which action shall be brought, or some memorandum
or note therof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him law-
fully authorized."
Ostensibly the purpose of the statute was to prevent per-
juries and fraud and on its face would seem to be unequivocal,
yet courts, ". . . sometimes yield to the appeal made to their
sympathies by the exigencies of special circumstances and in this
way there has gradually developed upon this "bulwark of juris-
prudence" a parasite strangely coddled and nurtured by judges
who have allowed themselves from time to time to be carried
away by prejudice from these special circumstances." ' 2 This
parasite is the so-called doctrine of part performance, the de-
velopment of which is an excellent example of judicial legisla-
tion.
Experience of centuries had shown the English people that
in a great many cases men were deprived of their lawful prop-
erty by the fraud of parties and the perjury of witnesses swear-
ing to parol agreements and to livery of seisin which were con-
trary to the actual facts. Passed in the light of the circum-
stances then existing the clear and obvious purpose of the stat-
ute was to prevent fraud and perjury. But courts of equity
soon saw that strict application of the statute might work great
hardship on a people that for centuries had been accustomed to
transfering land by livery of seisin only, especially when the
majority could neither read nor write. Consequently less than
ten years after the passage of the statute the court began to de-
' Statute 29 Charles II; 8 Statutes at Large, 405.
2 "Judicial Repeal of the Statute of Frauds," by Jessee W. Lilien-
thal, 9 Harvard Law Review 455.
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velop the principle that certain acts of part performance by way
of carrying out a parol contract for the sale of lands warrant
a court of equity to decree specific performance notwithstanding
the apparently unequivocal language of the Statute of Frauds.
The explanation3 of the, doctrine of part performance that
prevails today seems to be that expressed by Lord Westbury to
the effect that, ". . . equity will not permit the statute, the
purpose of which was to prevent fraud, to be used as an instru-
ment to eommit it,"'4 and somewhat, elaborated in Brown v.
Hoag,5 ". . . where one of the contracting parties has been in-
duced or allowed to alter his situation on the faith of an oral
agreement within the statute, to such an extent that it would be
a fraud on the part of the other party to set up is invalidity,
equity will make the case an exception to the statute." It is
pointed out that ". . . the difficulty is in applying the princi-
ple to the facts of the particular case, and in determining
whether a fraud will result unless the agreement be enforced,"
since, "Acts of part performance may be done which will not
take the case out of the statute." 6 The problem, then, is to de-
termine in general, what acts of part performance have been
deemed sufficient to raise the statute, with special emphasis upon
the influence the delivery of possession has had upon the doc-
trine.
Four states while adopting almost in its entirety the English
Statute of Frauds, have steadfastly refused to follow the prac-
tice of the English courts in allowing part performance to raise
the statute, and in those states all contracts relating to the sale
of land or to any interest therein require a writing to make them
enforceable.7  It is interesting to note, however, that the pur-
8 Other explanations of the doctrine have been given; for instance,
it was suggested that part performance is a valid substitute for the
requisite writing required by the statute; but the rule was established
by equity and only equitable remedies are available. It cannot there-
fore be said that the requirements are satisfied by part performance.
It was also suggested by Mr. Costigan that the statute was never in-
tended to apply to courts of equity, but the rule as laid down by the
courts has been otherwise (14 Ill. Law Review 5).
4McCormick v. Grogan, 4 L. R. (H. of L.) 82 (1869).
'35 Minnesota 373, 29 N. W. 135 (1886).
6S4ngerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197, 39 N. W. 146 (1888).
"Doty v. Doty, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S. W. 803 (1904); Goodlow v. Goo-
low, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767 (1906); Washington v. Soria, 73 Miss.
665, 19 So. 485 (1895); Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E. 143(1900).
POSSESSION AND STATUTE OF FlAu s
chaser has been protected by giving him a lien to the extent of
the improvements or the purchase money.8
Those acts of part performance which are usually relied
upon to take the case out of the statute are: payment of all or
part of the purchase price; permanent and valuable improve-
ments; possession by the purchaser with the consent of the ven-
dor, or combinations of the above acts. It is well settled both in
England and the United States that mere payment of the pur-
chase money is not a sufficient part performance. 9 The doctrine
that services rendered as payment in pursuance of an oral
promise to convey an interest in land do not take the case out of
the statute is followed generally 10 But in cases of severe hard-
ship, where the purchaser has given up other occupation or has
materially altered his position in life to such an extent that it
would be a virtual fraud upon him to bar recovery because of
the statute, services have been held to be sufficient part per-
formance." It is well settled that marriage is not sufficient part
performance to raise the statute.' 2 The making of valuable im-
provements and payment of purchase money taken together have
been held sufficient.' 3
It is difficult to understand the principles of equity which
underlie that group of cases known as the "possession cases"
and efforts of the chancellors to support it rationally have been
singularly unhappy. In truth some chancellors have come to
2 See Usher v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552, 17 S. W. 132 (1886).
' Lord Hardwicke stated a contrary opinion in Lacon v. Martins,
3 Atk. 1, but this opinion has been overruled. See Frame v. Dawson,
14 Vesey 386, where it is said, "Lord Redesdale, in a case before him,
states his opinion that payment of money is not a part performance;
yet there the act can hardly be said to be equivocal in its nature; as
the payment of a price presupposes a sale; but the money may be
repaid; and the parties restored to their former position." Also see
Britain v. Rossiter, 11 Q. B. D. 123, where Cotton L. J. said, "It is well
established and cannot be denied that the receipt of any sum under the
contract, will not entitle the other to enforce a contract within the
4th section."
1OMills v. Joiner, 20 Fla. 479 (household services of daughter);
Peters v. Dickinson, 67 N. H. 389 (work and labor); Eflis v. Cary, 74
Wis. 73 (legal services).
uLoyd v. Hollenbaclk, 98 Mich. 203; Pflugar v. Putiz, 43 N. J. Eq.
440.
, Lord Cranworth in Caton v. Caton, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 137 (1866),
"That marriage is not part performance within the rule of equity is cer-
tain. Marriage is necessary in order to bring the case within the stat-
ute, and to hold that it also takes the case out of the statute would be
a palpable absurdity."
"Fulton v. Jansen, 99 Cal. 587, 34 Pac. 331.
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regard it as an anomaly in the law with nothing more to sup-
port it than history and precedent. 14
Obviously in cases where there is actual fraud,15 the case
can be taken out of the statute on purely equitable grounds sup-
ported by the reasoning that equity will not permit a statute the
purpose of which was to prevent fraud, to be use as an instru-
ment to effect it. But unless in equity it amounts to a fraud
where the defendant pleads an unequivocal statute which re-
quires a writing in all contracts where land is the subject matter,
it is difficult to understand why possession of the land by the pur-
chaser should be sufficient to raise the statute. A review of
some of the reasons which have been given by the courts may be
enlightening.
The English rule16 is that receipt of possession from one's
vendor or lessor, or the taking of possession with the consent of
the vendor or lessor, takes the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
This view has been followed in some of the states. 17 The pre-
vailing English rule was adopted at a time when the courts had
a manifestly hostile attitude toward Statutes passed by Parlia-
1" See the remarks of Lord Blackburn in Maddison v. Alderson, L.
R. 8 Appeal Cases 467 (1883): "This is, I think, in effect to construe the
fourth section of the Statute of Frauds as if it contained these words,
'or unless possession of the land shall be given and accepted.' Not-
withstanding the very high authority of those who have decided those
cases I should not hesitate if it was res integra In refusing to inter-
polate those words, or put such a construction on the statute. But it
is not res integra, and I think that the cases are so numerous that
this anomaly, if, as I think, it is an anomaly, must be taken as to some
extent at least established. If it was originally an error it is now, I
think, communis error, and so makes the law."
11 See Foxcroft v. Lessler, 1 English Reports 105 (1700), where the
defendant kept back deeds from the dying man when he wished to
execute them; also Mullet v. Halfpenny, 2 Vern. 373. See comments of
Lord Hardwicke in Welford v. Beazley, 3 Atk. 503. Compare Bawde8 v.
Amhurst, 2 Pr. in Ch. 402.
" Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22.
1-T Cases cited in 1 Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction 279, note 1.
Williston in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 194, lists
thirteen states which either by decision or dicta have held possession
alone sufficient, but also makes the statement that it is doubtful if
this Is the majority view in America today. He cites the following
cases as apparently holding possession alone as enough: Puterbaugh
v. Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. 280; Anderson v. Simpson, 21 Iowa 399 (by
statute); Wharton v. Stoutenburg, 35 N. J. Eq. 266. Moreover posses-
sion alone has been specifically held not to be sufficient; see Glass v.
Hulbert, 102 Mass. 32; Corb7y v. Corbly (Ill.), 117 N. E. 393. It is sub-
.mitted that while it is often said that possession alone is sufficient
the cases which are cited to uphold this contention often contain other
elements. See Miller v. Lorentz, 39 W. Va. 160.
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ment which was coupled with a belief in a natural justice above
the ordinary laws of man and an exaggerated sense of their
ethical responsibility. It originally contemplated the taking of
possession by the purchaser as in substance a common law con-
veyance by livery of seizin.'5 Some states which have followed
the English rule have supported it upon the livery of seizin con-
cept, namely, that at the time the English statute was passed
livery of seisin was the only method by which land was con-
veyed, and that it was entirely natural that cases would arise
where injustice would be done unless the statute were to receive
an equitable interpretation, and in view of the circumstances the
presumption was that the statute was not passed for the purpose
of violating the common law. Furthermore if the vendee was
put in possession by the vendor this was certainly the best evi-
dence of a previous livery of seizin and in view of the hardship
inuring to the purchaser if the statute was rigidly enforced,
there being no other method of conveying land, possession under
these circumstances was held sufficient to avoid the statute.19
The fallacy of this reasoning is best illustrated by a quotation
from Poorman v. Kilgore,2 0 "But exceptions founded on this
principle must naturally be but temporary expedients, which
must die away when the new law itself has become part of the
general law of the country. Now that common law form has worn
out and delivery takes place without any form at all, almost al-
ways by a mere entry on a permission, expressed or implied, and
thus the publicity and form of the delivery no longer avails as a
check upon the mere invention of the sale."
It might be argued that the statute was passed in a direct
attempt to abolish all forms at common law which were con-
ducive to fraud, of which livery of seizin was one.
Another explanation which has been offered is, that if the
vendee in possession is not allowed to show the existence of a
contract by which he went into possession he lays himself open
to an action of trespass, which would be a fraud of the worst
character upon him. Then it is argued, that if the contract is
"See the article by Roscoe Pound in 33 Harvard Law Review 952;
"Progress of the Law-Equity."
"For an excellent review of this doctrine see the opinion of Holt
J., in Miller v. Lorentz, supra, note 17.
"26 Pennsylvania St. Rpts. 365, 67 Am. Dec. 524.
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admitted for the purpose of defense to the action of trespass it
should be admitted throughout.21 It is impossible to estimate
the influence of this reasoning upon the American courts, but
there are many expressions of it to be found in cases in juris-
dictions which adhere to the English rule.22 But, it is sub-
mitted, this reasoning admits of some errors, for admitting the
truth of the premises the conclusion which is drawn does not
necessarily follow. That is to say, while not contravening the
statute to allow the contract to be offered in evidence as a defense
to an action of trespass, yet it would be in the very teeth of the
statute to allow a defendant to be charged on a contract under
the circumstances of the vendee in possession. There being no
fraud, since the vendee has an adequate defense to trespass,
there is no necessity for lifting the statute, as to do otherwise
would completely abrogate its provisions.23
Lord Selborne has explained the anomaly upon truly equit-
able grounds. "In a suit founded on such part performance, the
defendant is really 'charged' upon the equities resulting from
the acts done in execution of the contract itself," which is equiv-
alent to saying that when the plaintiff has established the act
itself, the court can then direct its attention to the "equities"
arising therefrom. His theory seems to predicate itself upon
striking a nice balance between the parties, for he continues,
"The matter has advanced beyond the stage of a contract; and
the equities which arise out of the stage which it has reached
cannot be administered unless the contract is regarded. The
choice is between undoing what has been done (which is not
always possible, or if possible, just), and completing what has
been left undone.''24 Here the major premise appears to be
This view is ably expressed by the Lord Chancellor in Clinan v.
Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22; ". . . if upon a parol agreement a man is
admitted into possession he is made a trespasser as if there be no
agreement. For the purpose of defending himself such evidence (i. e.
of the parol agreement), was admissible and if it was admissible for
such purposes there is no reason why it is not admssiible throughout.
That, I apprehend, is the ground on which courts of equity have pro-
ceeded in permitting part performance of an agreement to be a ground
for avoiding the statute."
2 See Mowery v. Davis, 12 Ind. App. 681 Ealanchni v. Branstetter.
84 Cal. 249; McNeil v. Jones, 21 Ark. 277; Edwards v. Fry, 9 Kans.
417; Coney v. Timmons, 16 S. C. 378.
3 See Ann Berta Lodge v. Leverton, 43 Texas 18.
2'Maddison v. Alderson, supra, note 14.
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erroneous, for it is the contract which the court is enforcing not
the equities. This is expressed rather strongly in Brown v. Pit-
tinger,2 5 "Part performance will take the case out of the statute
and support the suit on the agreement."
Another line of decisions has explained the doctrine on the
ground that coupled with fraud the act done as part perform-
ance must be done in reference to a contract, before the statute
is raised, thus putting the jurisdiction not merely on the ground
of fraud but upon evidence.2 6 This view considers the Statute
as evidential, and as possession has been said to be inexplicable
other than pointing to a contract, the natural presumption is
that possession is sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute. But
granting that the statute is evidential, it provides in no uncer-
tain terms what evidence shall be sufficient, namely, a writing,
and admission of any evidence other than a writing would seem
to be a direct contravention of its terms. On the other hand if
the statute is considered as substantive, under the facts, there
would be no contract. It might well be pointed out that as this
theory is not predicated upon fraud but upon the fact that the
plaintiff's act affords strong circumstantial evidence of some
eontract; an act, in itself trivial, might amount to part per-
formance sufficient to raise the statute, if it clearly indicates a
contract.2 7 On the other hand, acts not complying with this
rule have no effect, notwithstanding great hardship which might
be worked on the plaintiff.28 Then too, the taking of possession
with the vendor's permission is not unequivocally referable to
a contract, as possession might have been taken under a parol
license.
Many states while not willing to follow the English rule
strictly have followed it in spirit, but in so doing they have
sought to limit the arbitrary exceptions to the statute by pro-
viding that the possession must have certain required character-
istics, or be accompanied by certain other acts. The following
2581 N. J. Eq. 229.
""The acknowledged possession of a stranger in the land of an-
other Is not explicable except on the supposition of an agreement,
and has therefore constantly been received as evidence of an ante-
cedent contract and as sufficient to authorize an inquiry into the terms,
the court regarding what has been done as a consequence of contract
or tenure." Sir T. Plumer in Morphett v. Jones, 1 Swanson 173 at 181;
36 Eng. R. 344.
2Dickinson v. Barrow, 73 L. J. Ch. 701.
2'Maddison v. Alderson, supra.-Note 14.
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are typical examples: Where possession is sufficient it is usually
required to be exclusive ;29 it must he taken in pursuance of the
contract;30 it is also generally held that a mere continuance in
possession is not sufficient since it does not necessarily point to
a new contract, but might have been continued under a previous
right or title;31 and it has also been said that there has been
no change of position on the plaintiff's part which could work
a fraud upon him on refusal of specific performance.3 2 In addi-
tion it is almost universally held that the possession must be
taken with the consent of the vendor,3 3 since in the absence of
such consent there would be no fraud upon the plaintiff.3 4 Sev-
eral jurisdictions, while holding that possession alone is not
sufficient.say that it is necessary. 5 Taking possession in pur-
suance of a contract plus payment of purchase price in whole
or in part is usually held to be sufficient ;36 as is also possession
plus the making of improvements ;37 but this doctrine is limited
" Cronk v. Trumble, 66 Ill. 428; ohns v. Johns, 67 Ind. 440. It is
usually held that the possession of a son with his father is not enough,
inasmuch as the possession may be explained on other grounds rather
than on a contract. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 99 Pac. Reporter 814
(1908), where an oral promise by B. that if his son A. would support
B. and B.'s wife during their lives, that A. should have the property.
A. went into possession with B. and performed the required services.
The court held that the possession "was as exclusive as the- terms
of the contract and the circumstances would permit. . ....
3* See Frame v. Dawson, 14 Vesey 386; "It is necessary therefore to
show a part performance; that is, an act, unequivocally referring to,
and resulting from, the agreement. . . ." See also Brennan v.
Bolton, 2 Dr. & War. 349; where it was held that "Any act which may
be referred to a title distinct from the verbal agreement of which
specific performance is sought cannot be considered as a part per-
formance thereof, . . ." The same position was taken where the
purchaser had the power of eminent domain, it being said that "the
possession might be referred to the exercise of that power. Raisten v.
Siavannah, etc., R. Co., 51 Georgia 77. For other illustrations see 36
Cyc. at page 660, note 77.
"IDunckel v. Dunckel, 8 N. Y. Sup. 889; Barnes v. Boston, etc., R.
R. Co., 130 Mass. 38.
'
2 Ackerman v. Fisher, 57 Pa. St. 457.
Ozermak v. Wetzel, 114 N. Y. App. Div. 816, 100 N. Y. Sup. 167
(1906).
"Moore v. Higbee. 45 Ind. 487.
'Woods v. Stevenson, 43 W. Va. 149; Weeks v. Lund, 69 W. H. 78.
"It is the notoriety of change of possession in execution of a parol
contract, that more than anything else takes a case out of the statute."
Ackerman v. Fisher, supra, Note 32.6Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506; Frede v. Pflugradt, 85 Wis.
119.
3 THarman v. Harman, 70 Fed. 894; Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn.
715.
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in some states which hold that possession, plus improvements
plus payment is not sufficient unless referable to a contract and
with the consent of the vendor.38 In dealing with thesa cases
one might naturally be prompted to inquire why it is that pay-
ment of purchase money, or possession, or the making of valu-
able improvements, which in themselves are not enough to raise
the statute, still, when taken together, have that particular force.
Courts of equity have 'been extremely reticent in supporting
this apparent "anomaly upon an anomaly," and it is manifestly
for a good reason, as it is very difficult to understand, (speaking
'abstractly by way of illustration), how nothing plus nothing
can be woven into something which will have the force necessary
to raise a statute which appears unequivocal on its face.
There is apparent in many jurisdictions a healthy tendency
on the part of the courts of equity, while not repudiating the
doctrine of part performance, to substantiate it upon purely
equitable grounds, thus steering clear of arbitrary holdings and
ambiguous reasoning, which have proved to be so unsatisfactory
in the past to both bench and bar.39  Lord Cottenham has
usually been given credit for originating the theory of "irre-
parable injury" when he said in the classic case of Mundy v.
Jolliffe,40 "Courts of equity exercise their jurisdiction in de-
creeing specific performance of verbal agreements where there
has been part performance, for the purpose of preventing the
great injustice which would arise from permitting a party to
escape from the engagements he has entered into, upon the
ground of the Statute of Frauds, after the other party to the
contract, has upon the faith of such engagement, expended his
n See Black v. Black, 15 Ga. 445; Van Epps v. Redfield, 69 Conn.
104, 36 At. 1102 (1897).
rFor instance in the earliest case where possession alone was
h eld to be sufficient the judge said: ". . inasmuch as possession
was delivered according to the agreement, he took the bargain to be
executed" (Butcher v. Stapley, 1 Vernon 363), which is equivalent to
giving no reason at all, unless it be that a contract executed on one
side is not within the statute, a dogma that cannot seriously be main-
tained. Also see Ungley v. Ungley, Law Reports, 5 Ch. Div. 887, where
the court said: "The reason Is that possession by a stranger is evidence
that there was some contract, and Is such cogent evidence as to compel
the court to admit evidence of the terms of the contract in order thatjustice might be done between the parties." One might be led to re-
mark in this connection that the very purpose of the statute was
that justice might be done between the parties."
5 MyIne & Craig, 167.
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money or otherwise acted in execution of the agreement. Under
such circumstances the court will struggle to prevent such in-
justice from being effected; and with that object, it has, at the
hearing, when the plaintiff failed to establish the precise terms
of the agreement, endeavored to collect, if it can, what the terms
of it really were." Some courts have seized upon the general
principles of the doctrine thus stated and have confined the
principle of part performance, where sufficient to raise the stat-
ute; to those cases where damages at law would be inadequate
and the. complainant would suffer irreparable injury if the re-
lief of specific performance were not given. This appears to be
a step in the right direction.4 1 While admitting the force of the
argument that no act of part performance should avoid an un-
equivocal statute,42 still it must be admitted that the funda-
mental purpose of a court of equity is to give relief where the
"The evolution of the doctrine with this final result can easily be
traced in several jurisdictions. For instance, an early case in West
Virginia held that possession alone was a sufficient part performance
(Campbell v. Fetterman, 20 W. Va. 398; also Lipscomb v. Lipscomb,
66 W. Va. 55); but the recent case of Smith v. Peterson, 71 W. Va. 364(1911), held that acts done to be sufficient part performance must make
"an altered situation on the part of the vendee not compensative in
money, and make non-compliance on the part of the court to decree
specific performance on petition of the vendor, inequitable and fraudu-
lent." See also for a holding in harmony with this opinion, Wegman
v. Clark, 97 W. Va. 364 (1923). In the early case of Pugh v. Good (Pa.),
57 Am. Dec. 3, the Pennsylvania court took the position that possession
alone was enough, but this has been repudiated by Hart v. Carroll, 85
Pa. 508. Woodward J. speaking for the court said: "The evidence must
establish the fact that possession was taken in pursuance of the con-
tract, and at or immediately after the time it was made, the fact that
the possession was notorious and the fact that it has been exclusively
continuous and maintained. And it must show performance or part
performance by the vendee which could not be compensated in dam-
ages, and such as would make rescission inequitable and unjust." Also
compare the decision in Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sand. Ch. 279 (N. Y.),
with the opinion of Judge Cardozo in Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y.
230 (1922). The general rule as above stated also apparently prevails
in the Federal courts, Purcell v. Minor, 4 Wall. 513, and is undoubtedly
the rule in Texas, Dugan v. Colville, 8 Tex. 126; Ann Berta Lodge v.
Leverton, 42 Tex. 18. For an excellent statement see Burns v. Daggett,
141 Mass. 368.
"See the opinion of Judge Bibb, in Grant's Heirs v. Craigmileg,
4 Ky. 203, at 207, "Some judges have thought that another kind of evi-
dence was equipollent with written evidence . . . deemed part per-
formance. The same fraud and perjury which can conceive and prove
the agreement by parol can also prove the performance in part, in a
group of cases clearly coming within the mischiefs intended to be
provided against by the statute. So far as these decisions enlighen and
convince the understanding and judgment, they will be respected, but
we are opposed to adopting the construction of the statute of the Eng-
lish Chancellors."
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remedy at law is inadequate. This position is best illustrated
by the rule of the Massachusetts courts which is laid down by
Wells, J., in Glass v. Hulbert,4 3 "That the purchaser has been
let into possession, in pursuance of a parol agreement, has been
very generally recognized as sufficient to take it out of the stat-
ute. The reasoning by which this result was reached is far from
satisfactory; and even where the rule prevails, there are fre-
quent intimations that it is regarded as trenching too closely
upon the spirit as well as the letter of the statute. If it were
now open to settle the rule anew, we cannot doubt that it would
be limited to possession accompanied with or- followed by such
change of position of the purchaser as would subject him to loss
for which he would not otherwise have adequate compensation
or other redress; and that mere change of possession would not be
held to take a case out of the statute. However, it may be else-
where, we are disposed to hold the rule to be so in Massachusetts
Thus under the fraud theory, pure and simple, possession
alone would not necessarily be a sufficient act of part perform-
ance as the party to whom possession had been given might be
put back where he was before the contract, and no real loss inure
to him as a result. Possession plus improvements does not neces-
sarily preclude the possibility of one recovering for the improve-
ments made, unless the acts were such that adequate compensa-
tion could not be had except by conveyance of the land, or that
the party had so changed his position that irreparable injury
would result and it would be a virtual fraud upon him unless
specific performance were granted. This, it is submitted, is an
explanation of the doctrine which is truly flavored with equit-
able principles.
In conclusion it might be said that it is a futile thing to
bewail the laxity prevailing in the enforcement of the statute
which has permitted the doctrine of part performance to become
so firmly rooted in the law, and while it may be true that, "if
the statute had been rigorously observed, the result would prob-
ably have been that few instances of parol agreements would
have occurred, ' '44 still as pointed out by Lord Blackburn,45
4 102 Mass. 32, 3 Am. Rpt. 418.
,"Lord Redesdale in Lindsay v. Lunch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1, 5.
4 adison v. Alderson, supra, note 14.
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". . if the doctrine was originally an error it is now, I think,
cummunis error, and so makes the Law." In view of these cir-
cumstances it seems that the best thing to do is to limit the
application of the doctrine, that part performance will take the
case out of the Statute of Frauds, to cases where there is actual
fraud, and to where the injury to the plaintiff is irreparable
and the remedy at law is inadequate, which is in equity-virtual
fraud.
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